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(201)932-7363I. Introduction
The ongoing savings and loan crisis in the U.S. and the bailouts ofa
number of large banks in recent years in this country and similar rescues abroad
have prompted renewed interest in the topic of the lender of last resort.
The need for a lender of last resort arises in a fractional reservebanking
system when a banking panic, defined as a massive scramble for high powered
money, threatens the money stock, and hence the level of economic activity. The
lender of last resort can allay an incipient panic by timely assurance that it
will provide whatever high powered money is required to satisfy the demand,
either by offering liberal access to the discount window at a penalty rateor
by open market purchases.
Henry Thornton (1802) and Walter agehot (1873) developed the key elements
of the doctrine of the lender of last resort (LLR) in England. They contended
that monetary authorities in the face of panic should lend freely but at a
penalty rate to illiquid but solvent banks. Monetarist writers in recent years
have reiterated and extended the classical notion of the LL?.In contrast,
Charles Goodhart and others have recently posited an alternative view broadening
the power of LLR to include aid to insolvent financial institutions.
This paper discusses the role for an LLR in preventing banking panics
(section I), then briefly considers classical and more recent concepts of the
LLR (section II).Section III examines historical evidence for the U.S. and
other countries on the incidence of banking panics and LLR actions, and the
record of alternative LLR arrangements in the U.S. Scotland and Canada, as well
as the historical record on bailouts.Section IV offers some lessons from
history.3
II. Bankina Panics and the Lender of Last Resort
The need for a monetary authority to act as LLR arises in the case of a
banking panic -- awidespread attempt by the public to convert deposits into
currency and, in response, an attempt by commercial banks to raise their desired
reserve deposit ratio. Banking panics can occur in a fractional reserve banking
system when a bank failure or series of bank failures produces bank runs which
in turn become contagious, threatening the solvency of otherwise sound banks.
Two sets of factors, internal and external, can lead to bank failures.
Internal factors which affect both financial and non financial enterprises
include poor management, poor judgment and dishonesty. External factors include
changes in relative prices and in the overall price level.
Changes in relative prices can drastically alter the value of a bank's
portfolio and force it into insolvency.
Banking structure can mitigate the effects of relative price change. A
nationwide branch banking system that permits portfolio diversification across
regions enables a bank to absorb the effects of relative price change. A unit
banking system, even with correspondents, is considerably less effective. The
nearly 6000 bank failures that occurred during the decade of the 1920's in the
U.S. were small unit banks in agricultural regions. By contrast in Canada, with
nationwide branch banking, many bank branches in those regions closed but no
banks failed (with the exception of one, in 1923, due to fraud).
A second external factor that can lead to bank failures is changes in the
overall price level (Schwartz, 1988). Price level instability (in a non-indexed
system) --sharpchanges from rising to falling prices or from inflation to
disinflation -- causedeither by gold movements under the pre-1914 gold standard,
or more recently, by the discretionary actions of monetary authorities, can4
produce unexpected changes in banks' net worth and convert ex ante sound
investments into ex post mistakes.
Given that bank liabilities are convertible on demand, bank runsrepresent
a rational response by depositors concerned over their ability to convert
deposits into currency in the event of a bank insolvency. Sank runs in normal
circumstances serve as a form of market discipline, reallocating funds from weak
to strong banks and constraining bank managers from adopting risky portfolio
strategies (Kaufman, 1988). Bank runs can also lead to a 'flight to quality'
(Benston and Kaufman et al, 1986). Depositors may not shift funds from weak
banks to those they regard to be sound, they may instead convert theirdeposits
into high quality securities.The seller of the securities ultimately will
deposit his receipts at other banks with no loss of bank reserves.
However on occasion, in the face of an external shock to the banking
system, incomplete and costly information may make it difficult for depositors
to distinguish sound from unsound banks. In that case runs on insolvent banks
can produce contagious runs on solvent banks leading to panic. A banking panic,
in turn, will lead to massive bank failures, as sound banks arebeing forced into
insolvency by a fall in the value of their assets when a scramble for liquidity
induces a fire sale of assets.
By intervening at the point when the liquidity of solvent banks is
threatened -- supplyingwhatever funds are needed to meet the demand for cash
--themonetary authority can allay the panic.
Private arrangements can also reduce the likelihood of panics.Branch
banking allows funds to be transferred from branches with surplus funds to those
in need of cash. Commercial bank clearing houses by pooling the resources of
its members can provide emergency reserves to meet the heightened liquidity5
demand. A clearing house moreover represents a signal to the public that in
time of panic help will be available to member banks.
Neither branch banking nor clearing houses, however, can stem a nationwide
demand for currency occasioned by a major aggregate shock such as a world war.
Only the monetary authority -- theultimate supplier of high powered-money --
canbe successful.
Government deposit insurance can prevent panics by removing the reason for
the public to run to currency.1 Ultimately, however, a monetary authority is
required to back up an insurance scheme.6
III. Alternative Views on the LLR Function
i. The Classical Position
Both Henry Thornton (1802) in An InQuiry into the Effects of the Parer
Credit of Great Britain and Walter Bagehot (1873) in Lombard Streetwere
concerned with the role of the Bank of England in stemming periodicbanking
panics. In Thornton's time, the Bank of England --aprivate institution which
served as the government's bank -- hada monopoly of the note issue within a 26-
mile radius of London and Bank of England notes served as highpowered money
for the English banking system.2 For Thornton the Bank's responsibility,though
not a formal central bank, in time of panic was to serve as LLR.It should then
provide liquidity to the market, discounting freely the paper of all but
insolvent banks, no matter how large or important [Humphrey. 1975).
Bagehot, accepted and broadened Thornton's view. Writing at a time when
the Bank had considerably enhanced its power in the British financialsystem,
he stated four principles for the Bank to observe as lender of last resort to
the monetary system.
First, it should lend freely but at a penalty rate.3
"Very large loans at very high rates are the best remedy
for the worst malady of the money market when a foreign
drain is added to a domestic drain" (Bagehot, (1873)
p.56)
Second, the Bank should make clear in advance its readiness to lend freely.
Third the Bank should accommodate anyone with good collateral (valued at normal
pre panic prices). Fourth, it should prevent illiquid but solvent banks from
failing."57
ii. Recent Extensions of the Classical Position
Recent monetartst economists have restated the classical position.
Friedman and Schwartz (1963), in A Monetary History, devote considerable
attention to the role of banking panics in producing monetary instability in the
United States (also see Cagan 1965). According to them, the peculiarities of
the US banking system as it developed in the nineteenth century, with its unit
fractional reserve banking system and reserves pyramided in New York, made it
highly susceptible to banking panics. Federal deposit insurance in 193L.
provided a remedy to this vulnerability. It served to assure the public that
it could always convert deposits into currency.
Friedman and Schwartz highlight the importance in the pre-FDIC system of
timely judgment by strong and responsible leadership in intervening to allay the
public's fear. Before the advent of the Fed, the New York Clearing House issued
clearing house certificates and suspended convertibility and, on occasion, the
Treasury conducted open market operations. In two episodes, these interventions
were successful, in three others they were not effective in preventing severe
monetary contraction.
The Federal Reserve System, established in part to provide such
leadership, failed dismally in the 1929-33 contraction. According to Friedman
arid Schwartz, had the Fed conducted open market operations in 1930 and 1931 to
provide the reserves needed by the banking system, the series of bank failures
that produced the unprecedented decline in the money stock could have been
prevented.
Schwartz (1986) argues that "a real financial crisis occurs only when
institutions do not exist, when authorities are unschooled in the practices that
preclude such a development, and when the private sector has reason to doubt8
the dependability of preventative arrangements" (p. 12). According to her all
the real financial crises in the United Kingdom and the United States occurred
when the monetary authorities failed to demonstrate readiness at the beginning
of a disturbance to meet all demands of sound debtors for loans and of
depositors for cash. Finally, she views deposit insurance as not necessary to
prevent banking panics.It was successful after 1934 in the U.S. because the
lender of last resort was undependable.Had the Fed acted on Bagehot's
principles, federal deposit insurance would not have been necessary, as the
record of other countries with stable banking systems but no federal deposit
insurance attests.
Meltzer (1986) argues that a central bank should allow insolvent banks to
fail, for not to do so would encourage financial institutions to take greater
risks.Following such an approach would 'separate the risk of individual
financial failures from aggregate risk by establishing principles that prevent
banks liquidity problems from generating an epidemic of insolvencies" (p. 85).
The worst cases of financial panics, according to Meltzer, "arose because
the central bank did not follow Bagehotian principles."6
Goodfriend and King (1988) make a strong case for the exercise of the LLR
functionsolely by the use of monetary policy, which they define as -- open
market operations, to change the stock of high-powered money.7 Because it need
not involve a change in high-powered money, discount window lending (DWL) to
particular banks, which they refer to as banking policy, is unnecessary. The
reason they regard banking policy as redundant is that central bank discount
window lending is similar to private provision of line-of-credit services. Both
require monitoring and supervision. The authors argue that it is not clear that
the Fed is more efficient than the private sector in such activities. According9
to Goodfriend (1989) the only reason the Fed currently has an advantagein
providing a line of credit is that it can make fully collateralizedloans
whereas commercial banks under current regulations cannot do so. There is
nothing to prevent the Fed from succumbing to political pressure to extend
credit to insolvent banks, although under current arrangements, discount-window
lending temporarily aids only illiquid banks. Moreover, discount-window lending
can delay a declaration of insolvency by a bank that pledges its bestcollateral
and uses the loan to pay off uninsured depositors before it is closed thus
shifting the loss from uninsured depositors to the FDIC.It also ex ante
reduces monitoring by depositors and enhances risk taking by the banks.8
Coodfriend and King regard government-provided deposit insurance as
basically a substitute for the portfolio diversification of a nationwide branch
banking system.By itself, without LLR support of high-powered money by the
monetary authorities, deposit insurance is insufficient to protectthe banking
system as a whole from an aggregate shock.
iii. The Case for Central Bank Bailouts
Charles Coodhart (1985, 1987) advocates central bank assistance to
insolvent banks. He argues that the distinction between illiquidity and
insolvency is a myth, since banks requiring LLR support because of "illiquidity
will in most cases already be under suspicion about ... solvency."Furthermore
'[bJecause of the difficulty of valuing its assets, a Central Bank will usually
have to take a decision on last resort support to meet an immediate liquidity
problem when it knows that there is a doubt about solvency, but does not know
just how bad the latter position actually is" (Goodhart, 1985, p. 35).
He also argues that, when depositors run from an insolvent bank in a
flight to quality, the valuable relationship between banker and borrower (based10
both on trust and agent-specific information) is severed. However this would
add to the cost of flight, making it less likely to occur. Replacing such a
connection requires costly search, a process which imposes losses (and possible
bankruptcy) on the borrowers. To protect borrowers Goodhart would have the
central bank recycle funds back to the troubled bank.However, as Schwartz
(1988) points out, borrowers need not require this arrangement, rather, they can
protect themselves from such a likelihood by simultaneously borrowing and
holding deposits with a number of financial institutions.
Solow (1982) also is sympathetic to bailouts. According to him, the Fed
is responsible for the stability of the whole financial system.Any bank
failure, especially a large one, reduces confidence in the whole system.To
prevent a loss of confidence from a major bank failure from spreading to the
rest of the banking system, the central bank should bail out insolvent banks.
However, such a policy creates a moral hazard, as banks in response engage in
greater risk taking and the public loses its incentive to monitor them.
Kindleberger (1978) includes under the rubric of financial crises,
deflations and disinflations, the financial distress of large nonfinancial firms
and of financial industries, abrupt declines in the prices of particular
commodities or assets, and speculative attacks on fixed exchange rate regimes.
Extension of LLR responsibility to all these situations ultimately makes the
central bank responsible for preventing any major losses in wealth -- afar cry
from the original conception of the LLR as providing a temporary source of
liquidity to the money market.
iv.Free Banking: The Case against any Public LLR
Proponents of free banking have denied the need for any government
authority to serve as lender of last resort. They argue that the only reason
for banking panics is legal restrictions on the banking system. Absent, such11
restrictions, the free market would produce a panic proof banking system.
According to Selgin (1988, 1989) two of the most importantrestrictions
are the prohibition of nationwide branch banking inthe US and the prohibition
everywhere of free currency issue by the commercial banking system.Nationwide
branch banking would allow sufficient portfolio diversification to prevent
relative price shocks from causing banks to fail. Free note issuewould allow
banks to supply whatever currency individuals may demand.9
Contagious runs because of incomplete information would not occurbecause
secondary markets in bank notes (note brokers, note detectors)would provide
adequate information to note holders about the conditionof all banks.Such
markets do not arise for demand deposits because of the agent-specific
information involved in the demand deposit contract -- itis hard to verify
whether the depositor has funds backing his check.However, clearing house
associations can offset the information asymmetry involved in deposit banking.
According to Corton (1984), and Gorton and Mullineaux (1987), clearing
houses in the nineteenth century by quickly organizing all member banks into one
firm, established a coinsurance scheme that made it difficult to focus onthe
weakness of an individual member bank. The clearing house could also allay a
panic by issuing loan certificates which served as a close substitutefor
specie. Finally a restriction of convertibility of deposits into currencycould
end a panic. Dowd (1984) regards restrictions as a form of option clause.'0 In
an alternative option (used in Scotland pre-1765) banks had the legal right to
defer redemption till a later date, with interest paid to compensate for the
delay.
For Selgin and Dowd the public LLR evolved because of a monopoly in the
issue of currency.The Bank of England's currency monopoly within a 26-mile
radius of London until 1826 and its extension to the whole country in 1844 made12
it more difficult than otherwise for depositors to satisfy their demand for
currency in times of stress, in turn creating a need for the Bank. as sole
provider of high powered money, to serve as LLR." In the U.S., bond-collateral
restrictions on state banks before 1863 and on the national banks thereafter
were responsible for the well known problem of currency inelasticity.
These writers do not discuss the case of a major aggregate shock that
produces a widespread demand for high-powered money. In that situation only the
monetary authority will suffice.
In sum, the two views briefly discussed have considerably different
implications for the role of an LLR. The classical prescription is for an LL.R
toprovide temporary emergency assistance to illiquid but solvent banks in a
banking panic. The Goodhart prescription is for bailouts of insolvent
institutions; and the free banking view argues against any role for an LLR.
With these views serving as a backdrop, I now examine evidence on banking panics
and their resolution in the past.13
The Historical Record
In this section I present historical evidencefor a number of countries
on the incidence of banking panics,
their likely causes, and the role of an LLR
in their resolution.I then consider alternative institutional arrangements
that served as surrogate LLR's in diversecountries at different times. Finally
I compare the historical experience withthe more recent bailouts in the US,
Great Britain and Canada.
i. Banking Panics and their Resolution
The record for the past 200 years for at least17 countries shows a large
number of bank failures; fewer, but a stillconsiderable number of bank runs;
and a relatively small number of banking panics.According to a chronology
compiled by Anna Schwartz (1988), in the U.S.between 1790 and 1930 in 14 years
bank panics occurred; Great Britain was next with8 years between 1790 and 1866
in which panics occurred, followed by France and Italywith 4 each.
An alternative chronology that I prepared (Rordo,1986, Table 1) for 6
countries (the U.S. Great Britain, France, Germany, Swedenand Canada) over the
period 1870-1933 lists 16 banking crises (defined asbank runs and/or failures),
and 4 banking panics (runs, failures, and suspensions
of payments), all of which
occurred in the U.S.)It also lists, based on Kindleberger's definitionof
financial crises (as comprising manias, panics and crashes)30 such crises and
based on Morgenstern's (1959) definition lists 71 stockmarket crises.
The evidence of a large number of bank failures inall countries, similar
to failures of nonfinancial firms, reflects in largemeasure the normal
operation of market forces.In addition to internal factors, theexternal
factors of relative price changes; banking structure; and changes
in the overall
price level were important. The relatively fewinstances of banking panics in14
the past two centuries attests to the fact that monetary authorities in time
developed the procedures and expertise to supply the funds needed to meet
depositors' demands for cash.Concurrently, the public developed confidence
that the authorities would respond in appropriate fashion.
A comparison of the performances of Great Britain and the U.S. in the past
century serves to illustrate the importance of the lender of last resort
function in preventing banking panics.
In the first half of the nineteenth century. Great Britain experienced
banking panics when the insolvency of an important financial institution
precipitated runs on other banks and a scramble for high-powered money ensued.
In a number of instances, the reaction of the Bank of England to protect its own
gold reserves worsened the panic.Eventually the Bank supplied funds to the
market but too late to prevent many unnecessary bank failures. The last such
panic followed the failure of the Overend Gurney Company in 1866. Thereafter,
the Bank accepted its responsibility as lender of last resort, observing
Bagehot's Rule "to lend freely but at a penalty rate." It prevented incipient
financial crises in 1878, 1.890, and 1914 from developing into full blown panics
by timely announcements and action.
The United States in the antebellum period experienced 11 banking panics
(according to Schwartz's chronology) of which the panics of 1837, 1839 and 1857
were most notable.'2 The First and Second Banks of the United States had some
central banking powers in part of the period, some states developed early
deposit insurance schemes (see Benston 1983, Calomiris 1989), and the New York
Clearing House Association began issuing clearing house loan certificates in
1857, but none of these arrangements sufficed to prevent the panics.
In the national banking era, the U.S. experienced three serious banking15
panics --1873,1893 and 1907-08.In these episodes, although the Clearing
Houses of New York, Chicago and other central reservecities issued clearing
house loan certificates, based on the collateral ofmember banks' assets, as an
emergency reserve currency and evenissued small denomination hand-to-hand
currency, lender of last resortactions were ineffective.In contrast to
successful interventions in 1884 and 1890, the issue of emergency currencywas
too little and too late to prevent panic from spreading.The panics ended upon
the suspension of convertibility of deposits into currency. Duringsuspension,
both currency and deposits circulated freely at flexible exchange rates,thereby
relieving the pressure on bank reserves. The panicsof 1893 and especially 1907
precipitated a movement to establish an agency to satisfythe public's demand
for currency in times of distrust of deposit convertibility.The interim
Aldrich Vreeland Act was successful in preventing a panic in1914.
The Federal Reserve System was created in 1914 to serve as alender of
last resort. The U.S. did not experience banking panic until1930 but, during
the ensuing three years, a succession of nationwide banking panics, asFriedman
and Schwartz point out, accounted for the destruction of one thirdof the money
stock and the permanent closing of 40% of the nation's banks. Onlywith the
establishment of federal deposit insurance in 1934, did the threatof banking
panics recede.
To continue the comparison between the U.S. and Great gritain,tables 1
and 2 present, for each country some detailed evidence on factors commonly
believed to be related to banking panics, as well as a chronologyof banking
panics and banking crises for severe NEER business cyclerecessions (peak to
trough) in the period l870-l933.' The variables isolatedinclude: deviations
from trend of the average annual growth rate of real output;the absolute16
difference of the average annual rate of change in the price level during the
preceding trough to peak and the current peak to trough as a measure of the
effect of changes in the overall price level; deviations from trend of the
average annual rate of monetary growth; and the percentage change in the money
stock due to changes in the deposit currency ratio.'
The tables reveal some striking similarities in the behavior of variables
often related to panics but a remarkable difference between the two countries
in the incidence of panics.Virtually all six business cycle downturns
designated by the NBER as severe were marked in both countries by significant
declines in output, large price level reversals, and large declines in money
growth.In addition, in both countries the deposit-currency ratio produced
declines in the money stock in the three most severe downturns: 1893-94 (U.S.)
1890-1894 (G.B.); 1907-08; and 1929-32.
However, the difference in the incidence of panics is striking --theU.S.
had four, while Britain had none.Both countries experienced frequent stock
market crashes (see Bordo, 1986, Table 6.1).They were buffeted by the same
international financial crises. Although Britain faced threats to the banking
system in 1878, 1890 and 1914, the key difference between the two countries (see
the last two columns of table 2) was successful LLR action by the British
authorities in defusing incipient crises.
Similar evidence over the 1870-1933 period for two other major countries:
(France and Germany) and two minor countries (Sweden and Canada), is available
in Bordo (1986) .Insevere recessions in all four countries the quantitative
variables move similarly to those displayed here for the U.S. and Great Britain.
Yet there were no banking panics. In France appropriate actions by the Bank of
France in 1882, 1889 and 1930 prevented incipient banking crises from developing17
into panics.Similar behavior occurred in Germany in 1901 and 1931 and in
Canada in 1907 and 1914.
One other key difference was nationwide branch bankingin all five
countries whereas the U.S. had unit banking. That difference likely goesa long
way to explain the largernumber of bank failures in the U.S.. However, the
incidence of incipient crises which did not become panicsin most of these
countries suggests the primary importance of LLR action.
ii. Alternative LLR Arrangements
In the traditional view the LLR role is synonymous with thatof a central
bank. Goodhart's explanation for the evolution of central bankingin England
as well as other European countries is that the firstcentral banks evolved from
commercial banks which had the special privilege of being the government'sbank.
Because of their sound reputation, position as holder of thenation's gold
reserve, ability to obtain economies of pooling reserves through acorrespondent
banking system, and ability to provide extra cash by rediscounting,such banks
evolved into bankers' banks and lenders of last resort in a liquiditycrisis.
Once such banks began to perform the role of lender of last resort,"moral
hazard" on the part of member banks (following a more risky strategy) provided
a rationale for some form of supervision or legislation.Further, Goodhart
argues that the conflict between the public functionsof such an institution and
satisfying the shareholders made the transition from a competitivebank to a
central bank lengthy and painful.
Though Goodhart (1985) Annex B demonstrates that a number ofcentral banks
evolved in this fashion, the experience of other countries suggeststhat
alternative arrangements are possible. In the U.S. before the advent of theFed
a variety of institutional arrangements served on occasion to allaybanking18
panics: deposit insurance schemes in a number of states which were relatively
successful before the Civil War (Benston 1983, Calomiris 1989); others at the
beginning of the twentieth century which were not (White, 1981); the issue of
clearing house loan certificates (Timberlake, 1984, Corton, 1984); restriction
of convertibility of deposits into currency by the clearing house associations
in the national banking era; various operations by the U.S. Treasury in the
period 1890 to 1907 (Timberlake, 1978); and the Aldrich Vreeland Act of 1908.
Two countries which managed successfully for long periods without central
banks were Scotland and Canada. Scotland had a system of free banking from 1727
to 1844. The key features of this system were a) free entry into banking and
free issue of bank notes, b) bank notes that were fully convertible into full-
bodied coin, and c) unlimited liability of bank shareholders.
Scotland's record under such a system was one of remarkable monetary
stability.That country experienced very few bank failures and very few
financial crises.One reason, according to White (1984), was the unlimited
liability of bank stockholders and strict bankruptcy laws that instilled a sense
of confidence in noteholders.'5 Indeed the Scottish banks would take over at par
the issue of failed banks (e.g. the Ayr bank, 1772) to increase their own
business. A second reason was the absence of restrictions on bank capital and
of other impediments to the development of extensive branching systems that
allowed banks to diversify risk and withstand shocks.'6
Faced with a nationwide scramble for liquidity such as 1792-93, 1797 and
1830, however, Scottish banks were able to turn to the Bank of England as a
lender of last resort (Cowen and Kroszner 1989)
Although Canada had a competitive fractional reserve banking system
throughout the nineteenth century, no central bank evolved (Bordo and Redish,19
1987).virtually all the elements of traditional central bankingundertaken
either by private institutions or directly by the governmenthad emerged by the
beginning of the twentieth century.
The chartered banks had, by 1890, with the compliance of the Government,
established an effective self policing agency, the Canadian BankersAssociation.
Acting in locus parentis, it succeeded in insulatingthe Canadian banks from the
deleterious effects of the U.S. banking panics of 1893 and 1907, by quickly
arranging mergers between sound and failing banks, by encouragingco-operation
between strong and weaker banks in times of stringency, and by establishinga
reserve fund to be used to compensate note holders inthe event of failure.
In addition, the nationwide branch system overcame the problemof seasonal
liquidity crises that characterized the United States afterthe Civil War, thus
lessening the need for a lender of last resort. However,the Bank of Montreal
(founded in 1817) very early became the government's bank performing many
central bank functions.
Because, Canadian banks kept most of their reserves on "call" inthe New
York money market, they were able on occasion in this way to satisfy the
public's demand for liquidity, again precluding the need for acentral bank.
On two occasions, 1907 and 1914, however, these reserves proved inadequate to
prevent a liquidity crisis and the Government of Canadahad to step in to
supplement the reserves.
The Finance Act, passed in 1914 to facilitate wartime finance, provided
the chartered banks with a liberal rediscounting facility.By pledging
appropriate collateral (this was broadly defined) banks could borrowDominion
notes from the Treasury Board. The Finance Act clause, which was extendedafter
the wartime emergency by the Amendment of 1923, provided a discount
window/lender of last resort for the Canadian banking system.20
In sum though Canada, Scotland and several other countries did not have
formal central banks serving as LLR, they all had access to a governmental
authority which could provide high-powered money in the event of such a crisis.
iii. LLR assistance and bailouts
The classic prescription for LLR action is to lend freely but at a penalty
rate to illiquid but solvent banks. Both Thornton and Bagehot advised strongly
against bailouts --assistanceto insolvent financial institutions. They
opposed then because they would encourage future risk taking and would not
invalidate the threat to other sound financial institutions.
Bagehot also advocated lending at a penalty rate, to discourage all but
those truly in need from applying, and to limit the expansion in liquidity to
just that necessary to end the panic.
European countries from 1870 to 1970 in general observed the classical
strictures. In the Baring Crisis of 1890, the Bank of England successfully
prevented panic. It arranged (with the Bank of France and the leading Clearing
Banks) to advance the necessary sums to meet the Barings' immediate maturing
liability with guarantee of any loss sustained by the Bank in the process
(Schwartz, 1986, p. 19).The German Reichsbank in 1901 prevented panic by
purchasing prime bills on the open market and expanding its excess noteissue
but it did not intervene to prevent the failure of the Leipziger and other banks
(Goodhart 1985, p. 96). The Bank of France also followed classic preceptsin
crises in 1882 and 1889.
The Austrian National Bank, however, ignored the classical advice during
the Credit Anstalt crisis of 1931. After the Austrian National Bank provided
liberal assistance to the Credit Anstalt at low interest rates (Schubert, 1987)
a run on the Credit Anstalt and other Viennese banks in May 1931followed upon
disclosure of the Credit Anstalt's insolvency and a government financial cescue21
package. The run degenerated into a speculative attack on thefixed price of
gold of the Austrian Schilling.
The U.S. record over the same period is less favorable. In particular,
the Fed has never lent at a penalty rate.
By contrast to events before 1970, when LLR action if unsuccessfulerred
on the side of deficiency, in the past two decades it has erred onthe side of
excess.In the U.S. the monetary authorities (FDIC and the Fed), on three
notable occasions, have provided liberal assistance to major insolvent banks:
Franklin National in 1974, First Pennsylvania in 1980, and Continental Illinois
in 1984. In each case the authorities guaranteed both insured and uninsured
deposits. Moreover they advanced loans at subsidized rates (Garcia and Plautz,
1988).Apparently the Federal Reserve has switched to a policy of bailout
reflecting a concern over the potential effects on the financial system and on
the reputation of the authorities of allowing a major bank to fail.
The Bank of England followed similar policies in the 1974 Fringe Bank
rescue and the 1984 Johnson Matthey affair. In 1985, the Bank of Canada
arranged for the purchase by the major chartered banks of the assets of two
small insolvent Alberta banks and compensation in full of all depositors.
By contrast to the Anglo-Saxon experience, the German Bundesbank allowed
the Herstatt bank to be liquidated in 1974 but provided LLR assistance to the
market.
Thus, although the classical doctrine has been long understood and
successfully applied, the recent experience of a number of major countries
suggests its basic message is no longer adhered to.22
V. Conclusion: Some Lessons from History
We can draw a number of conclusions from the historical record.
First, banking panics are rare events. They occurred more often in the
U.S. than in other countries. They usually occurred during serious recessions
associated with declines in the money supply and sharp price level reversals.
The likelihood of their occurrence is greatly diminished in diversified
nationwide branch banking system.
Second, panics have been prevented on numerous occasions by successful LL.R
actions. When they were not, either the requisite institutions did not exist
or, if they did, the authorities did not understand the proper actions totake.
Most countries developed an effective LLR mechanism by the last one third of the
nineteenth century. The US, was a principal exception.
Third, some public authority must provide the lender of last resort. The
incidence of periodic major international financial crises in 1837, 1857, 1873,
1890-93, 1907, 1914, 1930-33 suggests that in such episodes aggregate shocks can
set in train a series of events leading to a nationwide scramble for high'
powered money. Such a demand can only he satisfied by the ultimate providerof
high-powered money.
Fourth, such an authority does not have to be a central bank. This is
evident from the experience of Canada and other countries including theAldrich
Vreeland Act in 1914 in the US.
Fifth, the advent of FDIC in 1934 solved the problem of banking panicsin
the U.S., but absence of government deposit insurance before the 1960'sand
1970's in other countries suggests that it is not required to prevent banking
panics since they were panic free.23
Sixth, and finally, assistance to insolvent banks (bailouts) were the
exception rather than the rule until the 1970's.17 The monetary authorities in
earlier times erred on the side of deficiency rather than excess. Coodhart's
bailout view is certainly not a description of past practice.The recent
experience with bailouts flies in the face of the classical prescription.The
prescription for excessive risk taking fostered by liberal assistance to
insolvent banks, combined with deposit insurance which is not priced according
to risk, creates the conditions for an even greater bailout in the future.24
FOOTNOTES
*For helpful comments on an earlier draft I would like to thank George
Benston, Allan Meltzer and Anna Schwartz.Paulino Texeira provided valuable
research assistance.
'In theory private deposit insurance could also be used. In practice, to
succeed in the U.S. such arrangements would require the private authority to
have the power which the FDIC currently has to monitor, supervise and declare
insolvent its members. Also the capacity of the private insurance industry is
too limited to underwrite the stock of government insured deposits. (Benston et
al 1986, ch. 3). Alternatives to deposit insurance include requiring banks to
hold safe assets (treasury bills), charging fees for service and one hundred
percent reserves.
2Bank of England notes served as currency and reserves for the London
banks. Country banks issued bank notes but kept correspondent balances in the
London banks. From 1797 to 1821 Bank of England notes were inconvertible into
gold.
3Bagehot distinguished between actions to follow in the face of an
external drain --adecline in the Bank's gold reserve induced by a balance of
payment deficit -- raiseBank rate; and the action to follow when threatened by
an internal drain -- lendfreely.
4Bagehot has been criticized for not clearly stating when the Central bank
should intervene (Rockoff, 1986), for not giving specific guidelines to
distinguish between sound and unsound banks (Humphrey, 1975), and for not
realizing that provision of the LLR facility to individual banks would encourage
them to take greater risks than otherwise (Hirsch, 1977).
5According to Humphrey, the Classical position can be stated as:
(2) "S.. The lender of last resort's responsibility is to the entire financial
system and not to specific institutions.
(3) The lender of last resort exists not to prevent the occurrence
but rather to neutralize the impact of financial shocks.
(4)The lender's duty is a two fold one consisting first, of lending
without stint during actual panics and second, of acknowledging
beforehand its duty to lend freely in all future panics.
(5) The lender should be willing to advance indiscriminately to any
and all sound borrowing on all sound assets no matter what the type.
(6) In no case should the central bank accommodate unsound borrowers.
The lender's duty lay in preventing panics from spreading to the
sound institutions, and not in rescuing unsound ones.
(7) All accommodations would occur at a penalty rate, i.e., the central bank
should rely on price rather than non price mechanisms to ration use of its
last resort lending facility.
(8) The overriding objective of the lender of last resort was to prevent panic
induced declines in the money stock. .
(Humphrey,1975 p.9)25
6Meltzer (1986) succinctly restates Bagehot's four principles.
"1.The central bank is the only lender of last resort in a monetary system
such as ours.
2.To prevent illiquid banks from closing, the central bank should lend on
any collateral that is marketable in the ordinary courseof business when
there is a panic
3.Central bank loans, or advances, should be made in large amounts, on
demand, at a rate of interest above the market rate.
4.The above three principles of central bank behavior should be stated in
advance and followed in a crisis" (Meltzer, 1986. p. 83)"
7Friedxnan (1960) earlier argued against the use of the discount window as
an unnecessary form of discretion which "involves special government assistance
to a particular group of financial institutions" (p. 38). Also see Hirsch (1977)
and Goodhart (1988) for the case that Bagehot's rule was really designed for a
closely knit/cartelized banking system such as the London clearing banks.
8Cagan (1988) in his comment on Goodfriend and King makes the case for
retention of discount window lending in the case of 'a flight to quality'. In
that case OWL can be used to provide support to particular sectors of the economy
which have temporarily had banking services curtailed.
9According to the law of reflux, free banks issuing notes on the basis of
real bills can never overissue because the loans backing the notes would be self-
liquidating. See White (1984)
10However a restriction of convertibility itself could exacerbate a panic
because the public, in anticipating it, demands currency sooner.
"Selgin (1988) argues that the Bank Charter Act of 1844 exacerbated the
problem of panics because it imposed tight constraints on the issue of bank notes
by the Issue department.However the Banking department surely could have
discounted commercial paper from correspondent banks without requiring further
note issue. That is one of Bagehot's main points in Lombard Street.
'2selgin (1988) based on evidence by Rolnick and Weber (1986) argues that
the episodes designated as panics in the ante-bellum Free Banking era are not
comparable to these in the National Banking era because they did not involve
contagion effects. Evidence to the contrary however is presented by Hasan and
Dwyer (1988).
'3For similar evidence for the remaining cyclical downturns in this period
see Bordo (1986, Table 6 lA).
'4Holding constant the influence of the other two proximate determinants
of the money supply: the deposit reserve ratio and the stock of high powered
money.It is calculated using the formula developed in Friedman and Schwartz
(1963), Appendix B.
'5Sweden from 1930 to 1902 had a system of competitive note issue and
unlimited liability. According to Jonung (1985), there is evidence neither of
overissue nor of bank runs.26
'6Switzerland also had a successful experience with free banks 1826-1850
(Weber, 1988) but like Scotland she depended on the Bank of France as lender of
last resort (Goodhart, 1985).
'7Although in the U.S. the policy of purchase and assumption carried out
by the FDIC and FSLIC before that date incorporated elements of a public subsidy.27
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Table 1 
Banking Panics:  factors related to,  the incidence of,  and their resolution: 
United States 1870 
-  1933 
Reference  Cycle  Deviations  from  Absolute  Difference  Deviations  from  Percentage  Change  Banking  Banking  Resolution  Agency 
(peak  to  trough)  Trend  of  Average  of  Average  Annual  Trend  of  Average  in N due to  CrisisC  Panted 
Annual Real  Race of Price Level  Annual Monetary  Change in Deposit 
Output Crowth  Change (trough to  Qrowthb  Currency Ratio 
(peak to trough)  peak minus peak In  (Specific cycle  (specific  cycle 
trough)  peak to trough)  peak to trough). 
Peak  Trough  Percent 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
1873  1879  0.5  -7.1  -4.1  2.7  8/13  Restriction  Clear  i n  5 
ot Payments  Houses! 
Treasury 
1882  1885  -3.2  -12.2  2.6  5.2  5/84  Successful  Clearing 
LLR  Houses/ 
1893  1894  -9.5  -9.0  -9.3  -4.3  1/93  Restriction  Clearing 
of  Payments  Houses/ 
Treasury 
1907  1908  -14.7  -6.1  -1.7  -2.1  10/07  Restriction  Clearing 
of  Payments  ftouses/ 
Treasury 
1920  192].  -7.6  -56.7  -2.5  2.8 
1929  1932  -16.7  -12.5  -11.7  .27.4  1930.  1933  Unsuccessful  Federal 
1931,  LU  Reserve 
1932 
Data sources:  For all columns except (3)  see  Data Appendix in Bordo (1986),  for column (3)  see Data Appendia in Bordo (1981) 
Notes:  a)  the trend growth rate  in real output was 3,22 percent over the  period 1810 
-  1961.  It  WaS calculated  as  the  difference  between the 
natural logs of real output between initial and terminal  year divided by the  number ut years. 
b)  the trend monetary growth rate was 5.60 percent over the period 1870 
-  1941.  It was calculate,1  as in a) above 
c)  Banking crisis 
-  runs  and/or failures.  Source  Bordo (1986). 31 
Table 2 
Banking Panics:  factors related  to, the incidence  of, arid  their resolution: 






Trend of Average 
Absolute Difference 
of Average Annual 
Deviations froa 
Trend of  Average 
Percentage Change 





Resolution  Agency 
Annual Real 
Output  Growth 
Rate  of Price LeveL 
Change (trough  to 
Annual Monetary 
Crowthb 
Change In Deposit 
Currency Ratio 
(peak to trough)  peak •inus peak to  (Specific  cycle  (specific cycle 
trough)  peak to trough)  peak to trough). 
Peak  Trough  Percent 
(6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
1873  1879  0.9  .7.1  -3.1  5.2 
1883  1886  -1.2  -5.4  -2.8  2.3 
1890  1894  -0.2  -4,4  -2.5  -2.2  becinb  Successful  Bank of 
Crisis  England 
11/90 
1907  1908  -4.7  -13.6  -1.6  -1.0 
1920  1921  -6.9  -68.0  4.5 
1929  1932  -3.7  -7.9  -4.3  -1.3 
Data sources:  Same as in  Table 1. 
Notes:  a)  the trend growth rate in  real output over the period 1870 -  1939  was  1.48  percent.  it  was  calculated  as  described  in  Table  1. 
b)  the trend monetary growth rate over the period 1870 -  1939  was  2.71.  It was calculated as described in a) above. 
c)  Same cc in  Table 1. 
d)  Same as in  Table 1. 